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Abstract
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of diﬀerent
size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model
combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms
with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium
where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes
initially decline, but then rise again as trade costs fall even further. A range of
trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small
country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
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1 Introduction
The rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the increasing role played by large,
multinational firms have been amongst the most important dimensions of the continu-
ing globalization of the world economy over the past three decades. These developments
have had profound eﬀects on the attitude taken by governments towards the location
of mobile firms in their jurisdictions. This is reflected in the policies governments have
adopted in order to encourage investment by these firms.
One facet of this is the decline in corporate taxes as nations compete to attract invest-
ment. Table 1 shows that nominal and eﬀective average rates of corporation tax have
fallen significantly over the last two decades and this downward trend has been even
more pronounced in small countries. Nevertheless, corporate tax rates remain substan-
tial in large and small countries alike. Moreover, at least for the small countries the
downward trend of tax rates seems to have slowed down during the period 1995-2005,
as compared to the preceding decade. This oﬀers some first indication that there may
be a ‘bottoming out’ of tax rate competition as economic integration proceeds.1
****** Table 1 about here ******
Competition for mobile firms also arises through state aid for the location of new plants
or the expansion of existing ones. Such investment subsidies have become commonplace,
in particular in sectors that combine the use of modern technologies with the creation
of new jobs. This is well documented in the European Union (EU), where state aid
given by member states to individual enterprises in their jurisdiction must be approved
by the European Commission. Table 2 lists 16 cases for the years 2001-2007 where
investment subsidies in excess of Euro 40 million, and typically accounting for 10-
1Revenue from corporate taxation, as a percentage of GDP, has remained stable or even increased
in most OECD countries during the last two decades (see OECD, 2007). Corporate tax revenue may
not be a good indicator for the forces of tax competition, however, because it includes the eﬀect of
firms switching from unincorporated to incorporated businesses in order to take advantage of falling
corporate tax rates. Recent empirical evidence shows that this eﬀect may be substantial, raising
corporate tax receipts at the expense of personal income tax revenue (see de Mooij and Nicodème,
2008). Nevertheless, the evidence on corporate tax collections underscores the point that profit taxation
is not losing its importance. See Hines (2007) for a recent overview of these developments.
1
30% of the present value of the investment, have been approved.2 The recent apparent
decline in the number of such subsidies may, however, be first evidence of a policy
reversal in this area. In Germany, for example, an intensive debate on the justification
of subsidies for increasingly mobile investments broke out in 2008, after Nokia had
closed a mobile phone plant in Northrhine-Westphalia that had only been erected in
the 1990s, with the help of state subsidies, and simultaneously opened up a new plant
in Romania.
****** Table 2 about here ******
Finally, there are clear signs that increasing economic integration and the mobility of
multinational firms have led to conflicting interests between large and small countries.
During the last decade large countries, in particular, have found themselves under
increasing pressure to cut tax rates, in order to avoid losing investment to their smaller,
lower-tax neighbours (see Table 1). In the EU, for example, this has led to the adoption
of a Code of Conduct for business taxation that was directed primarily at the special tax
breaks being oﬀered to multinational firms. This regulation caused a total number of 40
preferential tax regimes to be phased out, most of which had been applied by small EU
countries (see Primarolo Report, 1999).3 At the same time the OECD (2000) launched
a campaign against ‘harmful tax policies’, which was directed almost exclusively at
small tax havens worldwide. Essentially these policy initiatives attempted to counteract
the way in which small countries have taken advantage of an increased organizational
flexibility in large, multinational firms.
In this paper we aim to contribute to the understanding of these simultaneous devel-
opments. For this purpose we set up a model that incorporates a desire on the part
of national governments to attract internationally mobile firms, but also gives govern-
ments the ability to tax location rents earned by firms. Countries diﬀer in the size
of their respective population. Our focus is on the development of tax rates and the
resulting welfare levels in small and large countries as economic integration proceeds.
2Davies (2005, Table 1) collects a similar list of investment subsidies granted by U.S. states.
3Examples of such preferential tax regimes were a split corporate tax rate regime in Ireland and
special tax rules for multinational holding companies in the Benelux countries. Both of these measures
were highly successful in attracting foreign direct investment.
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More specifically, we set up a model of generalised oligopoly in a region where two
countries of diﬀerent size use corporate taxes to compete for an exogenous, but variable,
number of identical firms owned by residents of a third country. Our model features
location rents for firms that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because,
in the presence of trade costs, firms want to set up in diﬀerent locations from one
another in order to reduce the competitive pressures that they face and increase gross
profits. This gives the host governments an opportunity to grab these rents through
taxes. On the other hand, we assume that governments want to attract firms to their
jurisdiction as consumers prefer locally produced goods to imports. Trade costs again
drive this motivation. Local production is cheaper than importing goods and hence
consumer prices are lower, and consumer surplus higher, when goods are made in the
domestic market.4 Other things equal, this makes governments willing to subsidise
inward foreign direct investment. The overall tax policies in our model thus derive
from the combination of these two counteracting forces.
Our model delivers two main results. First, we find a U -shaped relationship between
equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. Tax rates in both countries decline in the initial
stages of economic integration but rise again when trade costs fall further. This pattern
results as the relative strength of the two eﬀects on tax policy described above changes
in the course of economic integration. Second, we show that there is a range of trade
costs where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers
welfare in the large country. This indicates that, at some stages of economic integration,
there may indeed be conflicting interests between large and small countries with respect
to continuing the process of market integration.
The analysis is related to two strands in the literature. A first set of papers focuses
on the competition between potential host countries for a single multinational firm. In
these models the equilibrium policy generally involves a location subsidy to the firm.
Reasons why countries (or states) will want to attract firms include: scale economies
4Of course, increased consumer surplus is not the only potential benefit that might arise from local
production. For example, perhaps the most persuasive argument for government investment subsidies
is that multinational firms may oﬀer a wage premium over domestic workers’ outside options, an
extreme case of which occurs when inward FDI relieves involuntary unemployment. We discuss this
case in an extension of our model in section 5.
3
in the provision of public goods and services in conjunction with a mobile workforce
(Black and Hoyt, 1989); positive spillovers from employment in the host jurisdiction
(Haaparanta, 1996; Davies, 2005); savings in trade costs (Haufler and Wooton, 1999);
or technological backwardness (Fumagalli, 2003). Recent work has shown, however,
that these results change when an indigenous firm is already operating in one of the
countries (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006) or when countries compete for two mobile firms,
rather than one (Ferrett and Wooton, 2005). In the latter case, countries may even be
able to tax away all profits in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. A general feature
of these models is that they involve the comparison of discrete equilibrium allocations
and analyse specific scenarios that are diﬃcult to compare or generalise.
A second literature strand has analysed tax competition for internationally mobile firms
in models of the new economic geography (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman,
2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pflüger, 2006). These models em-
ploy a framework of monopolistic competition where otherwise identical firms produce
diﬀerent varieties of a composite good.5 This literature has stressed that agglomeration
rents can be taxed, at positive levels, by the government of a “core country”. However,
this result applies only in the special case where all firms are agglomerated in one
country, whereas subsidies are paid in equilibrium when firms are regionally dispersed.
In contrast the present model focuses only on interior location equilibria and shows
that positive tax rates can arise even if firms are fully dispersed in equilibrium.
Our analysis develops as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3
analyses the non-cooperative tax equilibrium and the allocation of firms in the case
where countries are symmetric and in the case where they diﬀer in size. Section 4 derives
the welfare eﬀects of economic integration, again diﬀerentiating between the scenarios
of symmetric and asymmetric countries. In section 5 we consider two extensions by
incorporating an employment benefit from FDI and by allowing for local ownership of
the active firms in the two competing countries. Section 6 concludes.
5For an extension that accounts for firm heterogeneity, see Burbidge et al. (2006). Another related
analysis is Fuest (2005) who studies the implications for tax policy when economic integration reduces
trade barriers but also increases the foreign ownership share of domestic firms.
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2 The model
2.1 Consumers
We consider a region with two countries  and , which compete to attract a fixed num-
ber of firms. These firms produce an homogeneous good, labelled , in an oligopolistic
industry. A second, private good, the numeraire commodity , is produced under con-
ditions of perfect competition. Consumers in both countries have identical preferences
for the goods, given by
 =  − 
2
2 +   ∈ { } (1)
The two countries potentially diﬀer in size. The population of the region is normalised
to unity and, without loss of generality, we take country  to be the larger of the two.
Let there be  ≥ 05 consumers in country  and (1− ) consumers in country . The
residents of countries  and  earn only wage income, while profit income accrues to
capital owners that reside in a third (outside) country.6 Every household in the region
supplies a single unit of labour. The wage rate in each country is determined in the
numeraire industry, which uses labour as the only input. Free trade in the numeraire
good therefore equalises the wage across the countries as . Moreover, total income
from the business tax (as detailed below), denoted by , is redistributed equally and
in a lump-sum fashion to the consumers in each country. The budget constraint for a
representative consumer in each of the two countries is then
 +  =  +   +

1−  =  +  (2)
where  is the price of good  in country . Utility maximisation leads to inverse-
demand curves − =  ∀ . Aggregating the demand for good  over all consumers
yields market demand curves for each country, denoted :
 = (− )   =
(1− )(− )
  (3)
When   05, the market demand curve of the larger country  is flatter than that of
country . In this sense market  is the more profitable one for firms, as we shall see
below.
6In section 5 we discuss the case where profit income accrues to the residents of countries  and .
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2.2 Firms
There are  firms in total, based in a third country and prepared to invest in the
region. Each of these firms possesses one unit of “knowledge capital” (such as a license
or patent) that can be profitably employed in the imperfectly competitive industry .
This factor is indispensable for the production of good  but limited in availability such
that, at most,  firms can engage in production. In addition, each firm faces fixed and
identical costs of setting up a production facility in each of the two countries. These
costs are assumed to be suﬃciently large to ensure that each firm will set up, at most,
one production plant in the region. Thus each firm will serve the regional market from
either country  or country .7 Firms are assumed to be identical except with respect to
the location of their production facilities. Location matters because, while all firms can
sell their products in both countries, there are trade costs associated with exports to a
firm’s foreign market. Thus each country’s market may be served by both “local” firms
that produce domestically and “foreign” firms that are based in the other country.
Labour is the only variable input in good  production. Each unit of good  requires
the eﬀorts of  workers, where  is chosen so that production of  does not exhaust
each country’s labour supply. Hence the marginal cost of production can be defined
as  ≡ . Since wage costs are equalised between the two countries, they do not
enter the location decision of firms in our model. The cost of exporting each unit of
output is  , which eﬀectively raises the marginal cost of serving the foreign market to
( + ). We are assuming that all of the trade costs are “real”, taking the form of,
say, transport costs or administrative barriers to the free movement of goods between
countries. There are no (endogenously determined) tariﬀs between countries  and  as
we assume that the region is a free-trade-area.
Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors and are able to segment their
markets, choosing the quantities to sell on their domestic and export markets indepen-
7If trade costs were suﬃciently high relative to these fixed costs, the firm might choose to “jump”
the trade barrier and produce in both markets. We assume that this is not the case. We further assume
that the trade costs between the region and the rest of the world are suﬃciently high that no firm
would choose to service the markets of  and  from a third country outside the region. For notational
simplicity the fixed costs are suppressed in the equations below.
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dently.8 The total operating profit of each firm, which equals the return to the required
unit of knowledge capital, is thus defined as
 = ( − ) + ( −  − )
 = ( −  − )  + ( − )
(4)
where  is the pre-tax profit of a firm based in country  and  represents sales in
country  by a firm based in country  (  ∈ { }). A firm is at a cost disadvantage
in its export market as the marginal cost of exports is higher than that for domestic
sales. Consequently an exporter will sell less in a market than an indigenous rival.
Suppose that  firms are located in country  and the remaining  firms produce in
country , where  +  = . Maximising (4) taking into account demand (3), yields
output levels per firm:
 =  [−  +  ] ( + 1) ;  =
(1− )[−  − (1 + )  ]
 ( + 1) ;
 =  [−  − (1 + )  ] ( + 1) ;  =
(1− )[−  +  ]
 ( + 1) 
(5)
We focus on the cases where the trade cost is suﬃciently low to ensure that  
0   0 and each firm exports into the foreign country’s market. From (5) and in
the symmetric situation, where the host countries are the same size ( = 05) and each
attracts the same number of firms ( = ), both countries will export if
−  −
µ
1 +

2
¶
  0 (6)
We assume throughout the following analysis that this condition is met.9 This con-
straint implies that trade costs remain below a critical upper limit, beyond which firms
will only serve their domestic markets. For the symmetric case this prohibitive trade
cost is
 = 2(− )
2 +   (7)
8In equilibrium, firms will receive a lower producer price for their exports than for goods destined
for the domestic market. The trade structure is simply a generalisation of the “reciprocal dumping”
model of Brander and Krugman (1983).
9Note that (6) is also a necessary (but not a suﬃcient) condition for exports to occur into both
markets when countries diﬀer in size and  6= . In this case it is seen from (5) that one of the
conditions for   0   0 will involve an even tighter constraint on  .
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We further assume that the resource constraints (+)   and (+) 
(1−) are met and that the numeraire good is produced in each country. Observe that
   1, confirming our assertion that a foreign firm’s share of a market is
always less than that of a local firm whenever there are trade costs (  0). Equilibrium
prices in each market are:
 = +  +  + 1 ;  =
+  + 
 + 1  (8)
Notice that consumer prices in both countries fall when the total number of firms 
increases and competition in the oligopolistic industry is thereby intensified. Moreover,
in each country the consumer price is a rising function of the number of active firms in
the other country. In other words, whatever the size of the industry, having more firms
producing locally intensifies domestic competition and drives down consumer prices.
Substituting (5) and (8) into (4) yields the pre-tax profits of firms in each country:
 =  [−  +  ]
2
 ( + 1)2 +
(1− ) [−  − (1 + )  ]2
 ( + 1)2 ;
 =  [−  − (1 + )  ]
2
 ( + 1)2 +
(1− )[−  +  ]2
 ( + 1)2 
(9)
We assume that profits are taxed at source by the host countries of the firms.10 Let 
be the lump-sum tax imposed on each firm by country . Then total tax revenues are
 =  ∀  ∈ { } (10)
The tax diﬀerential between countries is ∆ ≡ − . In deciding upon where to invest,
firms will compare profits net of taxes and locate in the more profitable country. The
locational equilibrium for the industry is characterised by − = −. Substituting
(9) gives the equilibrium number of firms choosing to locate in each country:
 = 
2
+
(2− 1) [2 (− )−  ]
2 −
∆ ( + 1)
2 2 ;  =  −  (11)
10There is an agreement in the literature that international company taxation closely follows the
source principle (Tanzi, 1995, Ch. 6-7). This principle applies directly, if countries avoid international
double taxation by exempting foreign-earned income from domestic tax. If countries grant an interna-
tional tax credit instead, source taxation is still eﬀective in many cases, because crediting applies only
after profits have been repatriated and because countries do not rebate ‘excess’ taxes paid abroad.
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Suppose, initially, that each country charges the same tax, that is∆ = 0. If the countries
were the same size ( = 05), it is clear from (11) that  =  = 2, that is, the firms
would be evenly split between the two locations. In the absence of trade costs, neither
country has a locational advantage and  is undefined. When   0 and country 
is relatively large (  05), the second term in (11) is unambiguously positive due
to the constraint (6). Diﬀerences in taxes will further aﬀect the location of firms such
that, if country  taxes firms more heavily than country  (that is, ∆  0), country ’s
share of the firms will be relatively smaller than it would otherwise be. However, as
will be shown in section 3.2, the third term can never fully compensate the second and
so the larger country will attract more than half of all firms in any asymmetric tax
equilibrium [cf. eq. (20) below].11
2.3 Governments
The governments of countries  and  each impose lump-sum taxes on firms that locate
within their respective jurisdictions. Importantly, these taxes can be negative, acting
as subsidies to attract investment to a particular country. If revenues from the business
tax are positive, then these are redistributed equally and in a lump-sum way to the
residents in the country in which they are collected. The costs of a negative business
tax are raised through lump-sum taxation of consumers. Recall that, despite their
lump-sum character, business taxes still distort the location decision of internationally
mobile firms [eq. (11)].12
Governments maximise the welfare of their representative consumers. To derive ag-
gregate welfare in each country, we use the budget constraint (2) to substitute out
for the consumption of the numeraire good  in the individuals’ utility function (1)
11Our analysis treats  and  as continuous variables. Hence we only approximate the “true” model
when the number of firms is small and the relocation of a single firm has discrete implications for the
equilibrium allocation. Alternatively, we can conceptually introduce stochastic location decisions of
firms and interpret  and  as the expected number of firms in each country. The main advantage
of this procedure is that we can derive equilibrium allocations and policies as continuous functions of
exogenous model parameters.
12Introducing an ad valorem profit tax instead of a lump-sum tax on firms would complicate the
algebra, but it would cause no further distortions and hence would not change our qualitative results.
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and employ the inverse demands to eliminate . Further employing  =  and
 = (1 − ), using the equilibrium prices from (8) in the market demand func-
tions (3) and aggregating over consumers yields:
 =  =  +  +   = (1− ) =  +  + (1− ) (12)
where  is country ’s total consumer surplus in market :
 =  [(− )−  ]
2
2( + 1)2   =
(1− ) [(− )−  ]2
2( + 1)2  (13)
Hence, given our specification of individual utilities, national welfare can be expressed
as the sum of aggregate consumer surplus in market , and the money income of all
consumers (the sum of wage income and tax revenue).13 Consumer surplus in each
country is rising in the total number of firms , as this intensifies competition and
reduces producer prices in both countries [cf. eq. (8)]. Moreover, a rise in the share
of firms located in country  raises consumer surplus in that country but lowers it in
country  because consumer prices are lower when more firms produce locally. This
gives each nation an incentive to attract firms to its home jurisdiction.14
3 Equilibrium taxes and location
3.1 Benchmark: Symmetric countries
We substitute (10), (11) and (13) in (12) and diﬀerentiate each country’s welfare expres-
sion with respect to its own tax. We first turn to the benchmark case where countries
are identical in all respects. Hence we evaluate the first-order condition for the optimal
tax rates at  = 05 and substitute the equilibrium allocation of firms (11), again using
this restriction. This yields closed-form solutions for the common Nash equilibrium tax
13Note that the wage income terms in (12) are constants and will thus not aﬀect any of our results.
14Clearly, savings in transportation cost are only one (analytically convenient) example of why
governments may want to attract internationally mobile firms. This motive could, for example, be
replaced by wage earnings that exceed workers’ outside options, or by technological linkages that exist
between the oligopolistic industry  and the production of the numeraire good . We will discuss these
alternative settings in section 5.
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rate:
 = 
( + 1)
∙
 − 2(− )− 
4( + 1)
¸
 (14)
where the superscript  stands for the symmetric case. These equilibrium tax rates
reflect two fundamental eﬀects that are at work in the present model.
The positive first term in the square brackets arises from a location-rent eﬀect. This
eﬀect arises because firms want to locate in diﬀerent markets, in order to minimise com-
petition between them. Intuitively, starting from a symmetric equilibrium and moving
one firm from country  to country  implies that each firm in country  now faces
more intense competition in its home market. Since a firm’s home market is relatively
more profitable than its export market, the gross profits of each firm in  fall, whereas
the gross profits of each firm that remains in  rise. This profit diﬀerential implies that
a location rent arises for each firm even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, and this rent
can be taxed by the host government.15 This location-rent eﬀect becomes stronger with
higher trade costs, as these increase the diﬀerence in profitability between the home
and the foreign markets.
The second term in the square brackets of (14) is the source of a consumer-price
eﬀect, which is unambiguously negative from (6). When an additional firm enters a
country, consumer prices fall and, as discussed above, this provides each country with
an incentive to oﬀer location subsidies to firms.
From (14) we can determine the critical level of trade costs  ∗ at which the two eﬀects
just oﬀset one another such that equilibrium taxes are zero:
 ∗ = 2(− )
4( + 1) + 1  (15)
For trade costs    ∗ the location-rent eﬀect dominates and equilibrium tax rates
are positive, whereas for    ∗ the consumer price eﬀect is relatively stronger and
equilibrium taxes are negative (that is, subsidies are given). Finally, neither eﬀect has
any impact in the absence of trade costs ( = 0). In this case of costless trade, the
Nash equilibrium taxes are zero as both governments and firms are indiﬀerent to the
15Algebraically, this eﬀect can be shown by diﬀerentiating the gross profits that each firm earns in
a symmetric equilibrium [eq. (9)] with respect to . The resulting profit diﬀerential between a firm
that is located in country  and one that is located in  is just equal to the first term in (14).
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equilibrium pattern of firm location.16
It should be noted that governments are constrained in their ability to tax, as post-tax
profits must remain non-negative for all  firms, otherwise some of the firms would
choose not to produce. To derive this constraint, we subtract the tax rate in the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium (14) from a firm’s pre-tax profits (9). Setting the diﬀerence
equal to zero yields a critical value of trade costs ¯ :17
¯ = (− )
£ − 2 +√132 + 8 − 4¤
(32 + 3 − 2)  (16)
Equation (16) defines a negative relationship between the total number of firms in the
market and the critical (maximum) level of trade costs ¯ . Intuitively, a large number
of firms  reduces the gross profits that can be earned by each firm in equilibrium,
whereas a high level of  increases the ability of a country to set high taxes. Only if
 ≤ ¯  will all  firms be prepared to enter and produce in the region. We assume that
this condition is met throughout our analysis.18
Comparing the critical value in (16) with the prohibitive trade cost determined in (7)
shows that ¯ ≤  for all  ≥ 2. Hence, for most levels of , eq. (16) is the binding
constraint in our symmetric model. When this constraint is met and all  firms make
non-negative after-tax profits, then there will also be trade in equilibrium.
How are the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates aﬀected by changes in the exogenous
parameters of the model? Consider first an increase in the total number of mobile firms
in the economy. Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to  yields

 =
{4( + 1) + ( − 1)[2(− )−  ]}
4( + 1)3  0 (17)
and thus an increase in  unambiguously raises equilibrium tax rates. Intuitively, a
rise in the total number of firms lowers the costs that are perceived by each country
16This special case is related to the analysis by Janeba (1998), who introduces firm mobility to the
standard model of strategic tax policy but does not include transport costs. He shows that equilibrium
trade taxes will then be zero in both countries, in contrast to the trade subsidies that result in the
absence of firm mobility (and with Cournot competition of firms).
17More precisely, this critical value represents an upper bound on trade costs, as we have ignored
the fixed costs of locating in either country (see footnote 7). If these costs are explicitly incorporated,
the maximum permissible tax rate, and hence the threshold value ¯ , are accordingly lower.
18It is easily checked that the level ∗, at which tax rates switch signs [eq. (15)], is below the
threshold level ¯ . Hence there is a range of transport costs for which positive equilibrium taxes result.
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from losing one of the firms to the other country. The decline in the consumer-price
eﬀect reduces the willingness of each country to grant location subsidies. Moreover
the larger number of firms strengthens the positive location-rent eﬀect. The stronger
is competition, and hence the closer prices are to marginal costs, the more severe is
the disadvantage of having to bear extra trade costs. Hence, starting from a symmetric
equilibrium, the penalty rises for a firm that attempts to escape high domestic taxes by
moving abroad, and this strengthens the ability of each country to tax location rents.
The comparative static result (17) makes it immediately clear that countries will not
find it in their interest to reduce the total number of active firms in equilibrium. Since
each country’s tax rate is rising in , so must be tax revenue. Moreover, consumer
surplus [eq. (13)] is clearly a positive function of . Hence welfare in each country
[eq. 12] is monotonously increasing in the number of active firms.19
Our main interest lies on the eﬀects of changes in trade costs. Diﬀerentiating (14) with
respect to  gives

 =
[4( + 1)− (−  − )]
2( + 1)2 
which may be positive or negative, in general. However, we can determine a critical
threshold value for  for which this derivative is zero. This is
 ∗∗ = − 
4( + 1) + 1  (18)
For    ∗∗, the tax rate is rising in trade costs, whereas for    ∗∗ it is falling in  .
Moreover, comparing (18) with (15) shows that  ∗∗   ∗2.
****** Figure 1 about here ******
The relationship between the level of trade costs and the equilibrium tax rates in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium is then as shown in Figure 1. We interpret economic
integration as an exogenous reduction in trade frictions. The figure shows that, starting
from high levels of trade costs (   ∗), a fall in these costs will reduce the ability of
symmetric countries to raise positive business taxes. Below  ∗ taxes turn negative and
19This eﬀect underlies the diﬀerent results in models where two countries compete for a single
monopolist and pay subsidies in equilibrium, and those where they compete for two mobile firms and
are able to levy positive taxes (see Ferrett and Wooton, 2005). Our analysis show that this eﬀect holds
more generally, and also applies to continuous increases in the number of firms.
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continue to fall until they reach a minimum (i.e., a maximum subsidy) at  ∗∗. To
explain this negative relationship for relatively high levels of trade costs, note that
the location-rent eﬀect and the consumer price eﬀect are both weakened when trade
costs are reduced. However, the ability of countries to extract location rents falls more
quickly as long as    ∗∗. If trade costs fall still further (   ∗∗), the relative strength
of the location-rent and consumer-price eﬀects is reversed and tax rates rise again until
they reach zero at  = 0. Our results for the symmetric benchmark are summarised in:
Proposition 1 In the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates can be either positive
or negative. As economic integration proceeds (trade costs are continuously reduced),
equilibrium tax rates fall from positive to negative levels and then rise again, equalling
zero when trade costs are eliminated.
3.2 Diﬀerences in country size
Having discussed the basic working of our model under symmetry, we now turn to the
more general case where countries diﬀer in size. We obtain closed-form solutions for
the asymmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates, which are derived in the appendix:
∗ = ( + 1)
∙
 − 
2( + 1)
¸
+
(2− 1)(3 + 2)[2( + 1)− ]
2( + 1)2[6( + 1)− 1] 
∗ = ( + 1)
∙
 − 
2( + 1)
¸
− (2− 1)[2( + 1) + (3 + 2)]
2( + 1)2[6( + 1)− 1] 
(19)
where  ≡ [2(− )−  ]  0.
The first term in (19) is identical for both countries and captures the counteracting
location-rent and consumer-price eﬀects that have been discussed above.20 The second
terms in (19) show how the overall bargaining position of countries vis-à-vis individual
firms is modified by an additional home-market eﬀect. Each firm will save aggregate
trade costs and thereby make higher gross profits when it locates in the larger coun-
try. This allows the larger country  to impose a higher tax than in the symmetric
equilibrium, whereas the smaller country  has to compensate firms for its location
disadvantage by oﬀering a lower tax (or a higher subsidy). Hence the larger country
levies the higher tax rate in equilibrium for any positive level of trade costs.
20It is easily checked that the first terms in (19) reduce to eq. (14) for the symmetric case  = 05.
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Our analysis focuses again on the eﬀects of falling trade costs. We first turn to the
question of whether economic integration will increase or decrease the concentration of
firms in the larger country. This is determined by substituting the optimal tax rates
in (19) into equation (11), yielding
 = 
2
+
(2− 1) [2 (− )−  ]
2
[3( + 1)− 1]
[6( + 1)− 1]  (20)
Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to  gives:

 =
−(2− 1) [3( + 1)− 1]
2 [6( + 1)− 1]
½
1 +
[2(− )−  ]

¾
 0 (21)
Hence a fall in trade costs unambiguously increases the number of firms in the larger
country . On the one hand, lower trade costs reduce the disadvantage that a firm
has from settling in the smaller market. There is a second eﬀect, however, which is
dominating in our analysis. Trade costs shield the firms that locate in one market
from the competition of firms that have located in the other. As trade costs fall, the
competitive pressure rises relatively more in the small country , because a larger
number of firms (those in ) become closer competitors. In sum, therefore, market
integration increases the concentration of production activity in the larger market .
Equation (20) also implies that a threshold level of trade costs, denoted  , must be
exceeded in order to ensure that a positive number of firms locates in the small country 
(i.e.,   ). This lower bound for  in the presence of size asymmetries is given by
 = 2(− )(2− 1)[3( + 1)− 1][6( + 1)− 1] + (2− 1)[3( + 1)− 1] 
The lower bound  is zero in the case of symmetric countries and it rises as the size
diﬀerential between countries  and  increases. In other words, if low levels of trade
costs (and thus a high degree of economic integration) are to be considered in our
model, then the size asymmetries between the two countries must not be “too large”.
Next we consider the eﬀects of economic integration on the tax rates imposed by each
country in the asymmetric tax equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating (19) with respect to  and
re-substituting the tax rates in the initial equilibrium yields:
∗
 =
2 [(−  − )∗ + (− )]
 [2(− )−  ] ∀  ∈ { } (22)
Hence, for either of the two countries, a positive tax rate in the initial equilibrium is
suﬃcient (but not necessary) to ensure that a fall in trade costs reduces the optimal
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tax rate. This result parallels that for symmetric countries. However, from (19), the
critical level of trade costs at which the large country’s tax rate turns positive is now
reduced relative to the symmetric case, whereas the critical level of trade costs at which
the small country is able to levy positive taxes is increased. The relationship between
trade costs and tax rates in the two countries is then as shown in Figure 2.21
****** Figure 2 about here ******
Our results for the case of asymmetric countries are summarised in:
Proposition 2 Consider two countries that diﬀer only in size. As trade costs fall,
() tax rates in both countries first fall and then rise again, with the larger country
imposing the higher tax rate at each level of  ; () the concentration of firms in the
larger country increases.
4 Economic integration and national welfare
We now turn to the welfare eﬀects of economic integration and start again with the
benchmark case of symmetric countries. Substituting (10), (13) and (14) in (12) and
setting  =  = 2 yields the maximised welfare for each country
  = 
2
8( + 1)2
©
[2(− )−  ]2 + 2 2[4( + 1) + 1]− 4(− )ª+ 
2
 (23)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  yields
 
 =
2
16( + 1)2 {[8( + 1) + 3] − 4(− )}  (24)
For high levels of trade costs, economic integration (a fall in ) is welfare-reducing
for both countries; while for low trade costs, a further reduction is instead welfare-
increasing. The critical value of trade costs where welfare reaches a minimum is obtained
by setting   in (24) equal to zero. This critical value ˜ is:
˜ = 4(− )
[8( + 1) + 3]  (25)
21To simplify the graph, Figure 2 ignores the fact that the maximum levels of trade costs that are
compatible with non-negative profits (¯) will generally diﬀer for the two countries.
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This U -shaped relationship between national welfare and trade costs closely mirrors
the relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. At high levels of trade
costs, a reduction in these costs weakens the location-rent eﬀect, reducing the taxing
power of governments and lowering both tax revenue and welfare.22 At low levels of  ,
a further fall in trade costs reduces the gains for each country from granting location
subsidies to firms. This alleviates subsidy competition and increases each country’s
welfare. Comparing the critical level ˜ to the level of trade costs that induces the
minimum tax  ∗∗ [see eq. (18)], shows that ˜   ∗∗. Thus, as trade costs fall below ˜ ,
tax rates continue to decline for some range of trade costs to the left of ˜ while welfare
starts to climb again. The increase in welfare is explained by the fact that the falling tax
revenues (alternatively, the increasing subsidy payments) are more than compensated
by the rise in consumer surplus associated with the reduction in trade costs.
To analyse the eﬀects on national welfare when countries diﬀer in size, we substi-
tute (11), (13) and (19) in (12). At low levels of economic integration, equilibrium
taxes are positive in both countries and a reduction in  will cause taxes and welfare
to fall. However the welfare-minimizing levels of  will diﬀer for the large and the small
country. Given that welfare in each country is a non-monotonic function of trade costs,
there is the possibility that economic integration will have the opposite welfare eﬀect
in each country over a certain range of  . In particular, it can be shown that this is the
case when the trade cost is equal to ˜ , as defined in (25). At this level of trade costs
(and, from continuity, in the neighbourhood of this value), the following holds:


¯¯¯¯
˜
 0 
¯¯¯¯
˜
 0 (26)
This leads to:
Proposition 3 There is a range of trade costs for which economic integration (a fall
in ) reduces welfare in the larger country but increases welfare in the smaller country.
Proof: See the appendix.
22This result implies that countries would have an interest in restricting trade in the early stages
of economic integration. We assume, however, that countries regard the level of trade costs as strictly
exogenous, the path of economic integration having been predetermined by, say, multilateral trade
negotiations or “single-market” treaty obligations.
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Proposition 3 is explained from the fact that both the location-rent eﬀect and the
consumer-price eﬀect are weaker for the small country. The smaller country is the less
attractive location from the perspective of firms, but it also has fewer consumers and
therefore has a smaller incentive to grant location subsidies. For this reason, country ’s
welfare level  reaches its minimum at a higher level of trade costs as compared to
. As trade costs fall below this minimum of , economic integration is beneficial
for the small country, but still detrimental for welfare in the large country .
Figure 3 illustrates these results. In the graph, economic integration has opposing
welfare eﬀects on the two countries if trade costs are in the range      , where
  is the turning point of  with respect to  .
****** Figure 3 about here ******
Finally, we illustrate the results of our basic model by means of a simulation analysis,
where we assume that  = 06. The results are summarised in Table 3.
****** Table 3 about here ******
In this particular numerical example the upper limit of trade costs that still ensures
non-negative after-tax profits is ¯ ≈ 068, whereas the lower limit for  that ensures
a non-negative number of firms in the smaller country is  ≈ 010. Columns (1) and
(2) show that    holds for all levels of trade costs [Proposition 2(i)] and country
’s tax rate turns negative at a higher level of trade costs than that of country . In
columns (3) and (4) tax rates are calculated as a percentage of gross profits. This ratio
approaches unity in both countries at ¯ . As is seen in column (5) this ratio initially
declines more steeply in the smaller country as trade costs are reduced, but then the
tax diﬀerence shrinks again. Column (6) shows that the number of firms in country 
rises continuously as trade costs fall [Proposition 2(ii)]. Finally, columns (7) and (8)
give the per-capita welfare level in each country. Comparing these two columns for any
given level of  shows that welfare is always higher in the larger country, which hosts a
larger number of firms and thus benefits from both lower transport costs and stronger
competition in its market.23 For changing levels of  , these results confirm that there
23There is an interesting contrast here to the literature analysing tax competition between countries
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is a range of trade costs  ∈ (015 025) where a small reduction in  lowers welfare in
country , but raises welfare in country  (Proposition 3).
These results of our model are roughly consistent with the patterns of corporate tax
adjustments in large and small countries, as given in Table 1. This table shows that in
1985, at the onset of economic integration, tax rates were at a “maximum” level that
was similar for large and small countries. In the early phases of economic integration,
tax rates fell more in the small countries, leading to a substantial tax gap between large
and small countries by 1995. As economic integration continued, the large countries
also cut their tax rates and the tax gap between large and small countries narrowed
during the period 1995-2005. As is shown in column (5) of Table 3, the initial widening
and later narrowing of this tax gap is captured by our model, if (analytically more
convenient) lump-sum taxes on each firm are transformed into ad valorem profit taxes.
Finally, even though there are many diﬀerences between our model and those used in
the new economic geography (NEG) literature, it is interesting to point out some of the
contrasting implications. A core diﬀerence is that positive tax rates are possible in our
model even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, whereas equilibrium tax rates are always
negative in NEG models when firms are regionally dispersed in the locational equilib-
rium (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005).24 Moreover, if all firms are concentrated in
one of the countries, the optimal tax rate of the country hosting the agglomeration is
an inversely -shaped function of trade costs, whereas it is -shaped in our analysis.
These diﬀerences can be traced back to the existence of a location-rent eﬀect in our
model, which arises because firms make positive profits in equilibrium. In contrast,
NEG models typically assume endogenous market entry which drives each firm’s profit
to zero. Hence no taxable location rent arises in either country and the location-rent
eﬀect accordingly disappears.
of diﬀerent size in models of perfectly competitive factor and product markets (Bucovetsky, 1991;
Wilson, 1991). As in our analysis, this literature finds that the smaller country levies the lower capital
tax rate. However, due to the absence of either location or competitive eﬀects in these analyses, the
small country attains a higher level of per-capita utility than its larger neighbour, because its lower
tax rate leads to a higher capital-labour ratio in equilibrium.
24See their Proposition 3. Note that there is an error in part () of this proposition. In the case where
countries are equal-sized, equilibrium tax rates will be negative (and not zero) in both countries. We
thank Tanguy van Ypersele for clarifying discussions on this issue.
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5 Extensions
This section discusses two extensions of our basic model. First, we add an employment
benefit from attracting foreign firms. This is likely to be an important policy issue in
practice. One approach to modelling this is to assume that workers in the -industry
receive a wage premium over what can be earned in the numeraire sector.25 Hence
all households are employed, but the -industry oﬀers the “better” jobs. In this case
there is an additional component to welfare maximization, as a wage premium from
employment in the -industry is added to consumer surplus and tax revenue. Even
though the higher costs of producing good  will reduce consumer surplus, this is more
than compensated by the extra wage income. Hence each government has a stronger
incentive to attract investment. This results in lower taxes, or higher subsidies, being
paid in equilibrium, fully reflecting the additional benefit from hosting the mobile firms.
One diﬀerence from the consumer surplus motive for attracting investment is that
the wage premium will be (largely) independent of trade costs. Hence while economic
integration reduces the ability of countries to tax location rents, it does not reduce
their desire to attract firms for employment-related reasons.
However, in addition to consumer surplus, some other benefits from foreign direct
investment will fall when trade costs decrease. For example, if the industry’s product
were a diﬀerentiated good and consumers had a liking for variety, reduced trade costs
would give consumers increased access to those varieties produced in the other country.
In a yet diﬀerent setting where the -industry produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate
good, attracting additional firms would reduce aggregate transport costs borne by the
final goods sector and increase this sector’s competitiveness. In each of these cases the
gains from attracting investment would decline with economic integration, as in the
case of consumer surplus. Hence when any of these arguments is incorporated in the
national welfare function, tax rates and welfare will continue to be a -shaped function
of trade costs, as in our benchmark analysis.
Secondly, we allow for the case where all firms are owned by the residents of countries 
and , with shares in proportion to their population size. The appendix shows how local
after-tax profit income is incorporated in the national welfare functions and derives
25The full analysis of this case is available from the authors upon request.
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the first-order conditions for nationally optimal tax rates. In this extended setting the
algebra becomes very complex and uninstructive, however, when countries diﬀer in size.
We therefore rely on simulation analyses, using the same numerical specification as in
Table 3 above. The results are given in Table 4.
****** Table 4 about here ******
Table 4 shows that tax rates are generally lower in both countries as compared to the
benchmark case (see Table 3). This is because the negative eﬀect of taxes on after-tax
profits is now partly borne by domestic residents. Nevertheless, the location-rent eﬀect
is still present since some part of the taxes levied by each country continues to fall
on foreigners (the residents of the other country in the region). Hence, for suﬃciently
high trade costs, a positive tax remains optimal in both countries. Moreover, economic
integration shows the familiar -shaped pattern for welfare in both countries, as in our
benchmark case. Note, however, that in our benchmark analysis economic integration
hurts the countries in the region by reducing their ability to tax firm owners outside
the region. This argument is no longer present when all firms are owned by residents of
countries  and . Instead the critical eﬀect is now that a fall in per-unit trade costs will
lead to higher volumes of ineﬃcient trade in equilibrium. Hence the total amount of
wasteful trade costs first rises and then falls as trade costs are continuously reduced (see
Brander and Krugman, 1983). For high level of trade costs, this eﬀect dominates the
pro-competitive eﬀect of market integration and lowers welfare, whereas at low levels
of trade costs a further reduction in these costs is unambiguously welfare-increasing. It
also remains true that economic integration benefits the small country and hurts the
large one for intermediate levels of trade costs. In fact, the parameter range where these
conflicting welfare eﬀects arise is enlarged, relative to our benchmark case in Table 3.26
26As in our benchmark analysis, it also seems to be the case here that countries do not want to reduce
the number of active firms in equilibrium. While such a reduction would increase profit income, which
now accrues to the residents of countries  and , this eﬀect is dominated by reduced tax revenues
and reduced consumer surplus in all the simulations that we have carried out.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have set up a simple model where two countries of diﬀerent size
compete for the location of an exogenously determined, but variable, number of profit-
making firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this model, economic integration leads to
a -shaped relationship between the degree of economic integration and the level of
equilibrium taxes. A special feature of the model is that taxable location rents can
arise even in an interior location equilibrium where firms are dispersed. At the same
time national governments have the incentive to attract internationally mobile firms by
means of subsidies in order to save on trade costs. These counteracting forces lead to
non-monotonic eﬀects of economic integration, with tax rates and welfare first declining
and then rising again as trade costs are continuously reduced.
Another result of our model is that economic integration can simultaneously benefit
small countries and harm large countries. This result may be relevant for several of the
recent policy debates in the area of international tax coordination, such as the elimina-
tion of preferential tax regimes pursued simultaneously by the EU (Primarolo Report,
1999) and the OECD (2000). Many of these policy initiatives are led by large coun-
tries trying to counteract the eﬀects of increasing economic integration, whereas they
are targeted at small countries that are perceived to be the beneficiaries of continued
economic integration.
Finally, the location rents that arise in our static model derive solely from the fact
that firms will want to locate in diﬀerent jurisdictions in order to reduce competition
between them in the presence of trade costs. Each firm makes its location choice once
and any subsequent relocation between host countries is not considered. An extended
model could incorporate firm relocations, associated with positive relocation costs, in
an intertemporal framework that distinguishes between initial location subsidies and
profit taxation in a later period. Relocation costs would then add to the location rents
that firms earn in their present location, increasing the taxing potential for host govern-
ments. It is known from the literature on tax holidays (e.g. Doyle and van Wijnbergen,
1994) that, when governments cannot commit to future policies, they compete more
aggressively via location subsidies in the first period, as each government is aware of
the advantage of attracting firms to its country when the investment is partially sunk.
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To the contrary, if economic integration were to reduce relocation costs over time, then
initial investment subsidies may fall as there would be fewer profit taxes to be captured
later. Incorporating these intertemporal aspects into a model of tax competition for a
mobile industry is a challenging task for future research.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation set (19)
Substituting (10), (11) and (13) in (12) and diﬀerentiating gives each country’s best
response function
 = 2
2
[4( + 1)− ] +
{(2− 1)[2( + 1)− ]− }
( + 1)[4( + 1)− ] + 
[2( + 1)− ]
[4( + 1)− ] 
 = 2
2
[4( + 1)− ] −
{(2− 1)[2( + 1)− ] + }
( + 1)[4( + 1)− ] + 
[2( + 1)− ]
[4( + 1)− ]
(A.1)
where  ≡ [2( − ) −  ]  0 and  ≡ (1 − ). Solving the set of simultaneous
equations (A.1) yields the Nash equilibrium taxes in (19).
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting (19) and (20) in country ’s welfare function [eq. (12)] and diﬀerentiating
with respect to  gives

 =

 + 

 + 

 
Performing the derivations gives, in a first step

 =
 [2( + 1) + 2 − ]− 2(− )
( + 1)2
−(2− 1)(3 + 2)(− ) 2(6 + 5) +
(2− 1)(3 + 2)[2 + 2− ](−  − )
( + 1)2(6 + 5)  (A.2)
which reduces to (24) when  = 05 and hence  =  = 2.
Evaluating (A.2) at ˜ , as given in (25), yields


¯¯¯¯
˜
=
(− )(2− 1)Ω
( + 1)2(6 + 5) where
Ω ≡ 2( + 1)(12
2 + 33 + 18)
8 + 11 +
(3 + 2)[+ ( + 1)(4− 1)]
2
+
(2− 1)(8 + 9)2
4(8 + 11)(6 + 5)
+
(3 + 2)[2( + 1)− ][(482 + 82 + 35)− (2− 1)(482 + 86 + 36)]
2(6 + 5)(8 + 11) 
Since Ω  0 for all   1 and   05 by assumption, it follows that  |˜  0.
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For country  we proceed analogously. Using (19) and (20) in  [eq. (12)] and diﬀer-
entiating with respect to  gives

 =

 − 

 + ( −)

 
Performing the derivations yields

 =
 [(2 + 2 + ) + 2(1− )]− (− )[(1− ) + ]
( + 1)2
+
(2− 1)(3 + 2)(− )
 2(6 + 5) −
(2− 1)(−  − )[2( + 1) + (3 + 2)]
( + 1)2(6 + 5)  (A.3)
which again reduces to (24) when  = 05.
Evaluating (A.3) at ˜ gives


¯¯¯¯
˜
=
−(− )(2− 1)Ω
( + 1)2(6 + 5) where
Ω ≡ 24
3 + 192 − 2 + 2(1− )(8 + 9)(3 + 2)(82 + 8 − )
4(8 + 11)
+
(3 + 2)
4
½
[4( + 1)(2− 1) + ] + (2− 1)(8 + 9)[2( + 1) + (3 + 2)]
(6 + 5)
¾
+
(8 + 7)[2( + 1) + (3 + 2)]
8 + 11 
Since Ω  0 from   1 and   05, it follows that  |˜  0, as stated in (26).
Section 5: Domestic firm ownership
With domestic firm ownership allocated in proportion to population size, the welfare
expressions for each country, inclusive of after-tax profit income, change to
 =  + ( − ) +  + ;  =  + (1− )( − ) +  + (1− )
where  is given in (13),  is in (9) and  is in (11). Diﬀerentiating yields the following
first-order conditions for optimal tax rates (in structural form):
 =  { [−  − (2− 1) ] +  [2( + 1− )− ]}( + 1)2
 =  {(1− )(− )(1− 4) + 2( + 2− )−  (2+ + 1)}( + 1)2
These values are used in the simulations of Table 4.
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